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#### Advanced SCADA Cybersecurity for Water Utility Personnel

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### Introduction

- Speaker Lee Tumbleson, P.E.
   Senior Control System Engineer
   RH2 Engineering/Control Systems Northwest
- BS Mechanical Engineering
- 5 Years water/wastewater design
- 32 Years of networking experience
   20+ Years RH2 IT Manager
   27 Years of industrial networking experience
- 27 Years of water/wastewater SCADA/Control experience
- 32 Years of computer experience/software development





#### **Session Overview**

- For non-Information Technology (IT) water/wastewater professionals
- Review common cybersecurity technology/terminology
- Improve communications with IT Staff/Consultants regarding cybersecurity topics
- AWWA/Homeland Security cybersecurity areas of concern

**Disclaimer** – Every network is different, and the information contained in this presentation may or may not be relevant to your system. RH2 and CSNW recommend using qualified IT staff or IT consultants that have cybersecurity experience.



### **Top Vulnerabilities in 2022**

- Phishing for usernames/passwords is #1 method of unauthorized access phishing has moved to an almost industrial scale worldwide
- Exploiting Remote Access security holes has climbed to #2 due to Covid
- Hacking is typically done for...
  - Spying (industrial/political, military) typically covert
  - Money Ransomware Attacks or Blackmail
  - Political Message Russia/Ukraine, Russia/US. Ransomware or worse
- Bitcoin is typical money transfer method for Ransomware password to unencrypt data this is difficult, but not impossible, to trace
- Phishing can also be used for impersonating someone with the power to move money around, this is rare but very profitable



#### **Very Short History of Cyber Attacks** Stuxnet released by Israel/US Against Iranian Uranium Enrichment Plant. Hacking up 400% since First acknowledged Nation Covid. Russian SolarWinds Hack. Russia hacking U.S. Early hacking attempts via State engineered hacking infrastructure. governments system 1980's 1990's Late 2000's 2010's Mid-2000's - General Mid-2010's - Edward purpose computer viruses Snowden exposes US Cyber used to gather data, money, Monitoring and Attack and destroy computer programs. Governments systems. 9/11 terrorist deploying cyber attacks on fears of SCADA attacks. businesses and government agencies. Russia attacking Ukrainian infrastructure.



# **Opportunistic vs. Intentional Attack**

- **Opportunistic** attackers only **attack** when given the right opportunity or reason most common
  - Clicking on the wrong website/email link
  - Downloading free infected software
  - Using an infected USB drive
  - Being infected on a network by another computer with security rights
  - Router/firewall weakness exploited
  - Remote access exploited Florida Treatment Plant
  - Forgot to lock the door or logout (operation security/physical security)
  - Disgruntled Insider has access
  - Opportunistic attacks can turn into intentional attacks once hacker identifies specific targets





# **Opportunistic vs. Intentional Attack**

#### Seven Stages of Intentional Attacks

- Reconnaissance Harvesting information on target (phishing/social media)
- Weaponization Creating deliverable payload
- **Delivery –** Delivering payload to target
- **Exploitation** Exploiting OS vulnerability (*Most expensive part of attack*)
- Installation Installing malware
- **Command and Control –** Remote manipulation of victim
- Action on Objectives Bitcoin ransom, information gathering, other motivations



### **SCADA System Designs**

#### • Old School – 1980's through early 2000's

- Air gapped systems no internet
- Only uses analog phone lines and serial communications
- Little to no TCP/IP networking. Serial, RS-232, RS-485, Proprietary
- Remote access over dial-up phone lines

#### • Modern – Last 20 years

- TCP/IP industrial Ethernet
- Systems commonly integrated with utility business IT
- Used by operations, engineering, planning, management, etc.
- Remote access vulnerabilities





# **Common SCADA Cybersecurity Risks**

- Physical and Remote access to SCADA system components
- Sharing SCADA network resources with business network
- Running office applications on SCADA computers
- Allowing SCADA network full access to internet
- Cloud-based control and/or data storage
- No onsite or offsite backup of SCADA computer systems
- Poor operational security (OPSEC)
- Exposed remote facility SCADA Ethernet ports
- Lack of third-party security testing/review







#### **Physical/Cyber Access to SCADA System Components**

- Facility Intrusion Alarms Physical barriers, door/hatch switches, motion detection, IR beams, camera systems with human motion alarms
- Facility Staff Access Dual factor authentication for computer systems, passwords, and eventually RFID for facility access

#### **Dual Factor Authentication** = Something you KNOW & something you HAVE/ARE

#### Examples:

- 1. Password/Biometric
- 2. Password/RFID Card
- 3. No Cloud Authentication (Phone)







#### **Sharing SCADA Network with Business Network**

- <u>Majority of malware infections come from business networks</u>
- This is due to the following reasons (mostly opportunistic):
  - Infected email
  - Hosting email or web server on-premise
  - Social engineering/Phishing "Use of deception to manipulate individuals into divulging confidential or personal information that may be used for fraudulent purposes."
  - Installing infected software
  - Infected websites







#### **Running Office Applications on SCADA Computers**

- Exposes SCADA network to business side infections
- SCADA computer should be single purpose machines for stability and security purposes
- Possible SCADA infection via USB drives/email/etc.

#### **Allowing SCADA Network Full Access to Internet**

- Full access is a very bad idea for reasons explained above
- Limited access is sometimes necessary for alarming and remote access:
  - Data should be encrypted from end to end when using remote access
  - Alarm email and text messages should go through an email relay so that alarm software is not directly exposed to Internet.



#### **Cloud-based control and/or data storage**

- Exposes SCADA network to the internet
- Internet outage impacts control







#### No Backup of SCADA Computer Systems (Disaster Recovery)

- In the chance of an infection, the typical response is to rebuild computers from backup media
- Many organizations backup their server data to "on-line" backup servers
  - This exposes the backup to malware while it's on-line
- Modern malware and particularly ransomware will encrypt all storage media it can find on a network

#### **Operational Security**

- Not using dual factor authentication
- Not changing passwords or having no passwords for access and/or control
- Poor malware protection
- Remote access by staff not monitored



#### **3rd Party Remote Access Services**

- TeamViewer, RemotePC, LogMeIn, GoToMyPC
- Centralized target for hackers

#### Lack of Third-Party Security Testing/Review

- QA/QC of cybersecurity design can be critical to identifying holes in the system
- Review should be handled by a knowledgeable third-party not involved in SCADA network design
- Outside security review can be expensive depending on scope of review
  - Review of existing design and then testing for security limitation
  - Secret physical/cyber breach based on no or limited information from client





# **Cybersecurity Architecture**

- A framework that specifies the organizational structure, standards, policies and functional behavior of a computer network, including both security and network features.
- A security architect (or IT staff trained in security design) is an individual who anticipates threats and is quick to design systems to preempt them.
- Secure network designs are dependent on the systems they are protecting. SCADA networks are fundamentally different than business enterprise networks and require different security.





# **Examples of Cybersecurity Architecture**

**Layered Defense -** Using layers of network security tools and procedures.

- Each layer adds additional % of security.
- Each layer approaches a different area of security.
- If one layer is compromised, additional layers provide additional protection.
- Security access that bypasses layers of protection will not see advantages of layered defense.



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# **Examples of Cybersecurity Architecture**

#### **Security Through Obscurity**

- A process of implementing security by enforcing secrecy and confidentiality of the system's internal design architecture.
- Security through obscurity aims to secure a system by deliberately hiding or concealing any security flaws or weaknesses.





### **Combined Security**

Using layers of network security tools for "layered defense" **Example:** 

Firewall, NAT, MAC Filtering, Port Filtering, DMZ Host







# **Common Network Security Terms**

# Common Network Terms to be Understood before Meeting with IT Staff/Consultants

- TCP/IP Protocol
- Industrial Protocols
- LAN/WAN Borders/Edges
- TCP/IP Port Filtering
- MAC Address and MAC Filtering

- VPN
- VLAN
- NAT
- Firewalls
- DMZ





### **TCP/IP Protocol Stack**

#### How to Transmit Data from Point A $\rightarrow$ Point B and Guarantee Delivery

Data broken into separate packets with delivery confirmed at Point B (or an error)



### **TCP/IP Protocol Stack-Device Addressing**

#### **Home Network Example:**

TCP/IP Address - Address of current device
Subnet Mask - Total addresses allowed on local subnet
Gateway - Address of device that leaves local subnet (internet router/WiFi router)
DNS - Address of device that translates readable addresses to actual TCP/IP address (Google.com)



# **TCP/IP Protocol Stack**

- All computers and devices that are on a network contain the TCP/IP protocol stack in software.
- Microsoft, Apple and Linux computers all have robust TCP/IP stacks that have been exposed and tested with Internet for decades.
- PLC'S and other IoT devices typically use Nichestack, an open-source TCP/IP software stack that vendors can slip into their systems.
- Several Nichestack security holes have been identified over the last decade with many of these issues never resolved in deployed systems.
- IoT devices are typically not able to protect themselves at the network level.
- Industrial networks must be protected at network borders/edge points.





# LAN/WAN Borders/Edge Security Tools

**LAN - Local Area Network:** "Typically" a private network that interconnects computer devices within a limited area **Examples:** Home, office, water facility, wastewater facility

WAN - Wide Area Network: "Typically" a public or private network used to connect Local Area Networks
Examples: Internet, cellular network, Radio Network-Typically a private network for SCADA systems





# **Port Address and Port Filtering**

**Port -** A port is a number that identifies a specific application or a type of network service. Port numbers extend from 0 to 65535

**Port Filtering -** Ability to only allow certain ports to communicate between networks. Used as a filter tool for network security

#### **Examples:**

HTTP = 80

Allen Bradley Industrial Protocol = 2222 and 44818

MODBUS TCP/IP Industrial Protocol = 502





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# **MAC Address and MAC Filtering**

**MAC Address -** A Media Access Control address (MAC address) is a unique identifier assigned to a Network Interface Controller (NIC). Should be unique to every Ethernet device

**MAC Filtering -** Ability to only allow certain MAC address devices to communicate between networks. Also used as a tool for network security

#### Example:

5C-F3-70-84-F4-40 (281 trillion different addresses)





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### **VPN-Virtual Private Network**

**VPN** - Extends a private network over a public network through the process of encrypting all communications data packets. Typically used as a way of securely connecting to remote devices. Illegal in many countries like China/Russia, Iran. IPSec is currently most popular standard version.

#### **Examples:**

- Home Office Computer  $\rightarrow$  Work Network
- Smartphone/Tablet/Laptop → SCADA Computer Network





### VLAN-Virtual Local Area Network

VLAN - Method of isolating Local Area Networks on shared network equipment **Examples:** 

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VLAN 1  $\rightarrow$  Business Network VLAN 2  $\rightarrow$  SCADA Network



### **NAT-Network Address Translation**

**NAT -** Remapping LAN IP addresses into public IP addresses by modifying network address information as data passes through edge router. Prevents internet traffic from directly accessing LAN devices unless request started on LAN device.

#### **Private IP Address Examples**:

10.0.0 to 10.255.255.255 172.16.0.0 to 172.31.255.255 192.168.0.0 to 192.168.255.255 192.168.22.5 NAT Router

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#### **Firewalls**

**Firewall -** A network security system that monitors and controls incoming and outgoing network traffic based on predetermined security rules. Establishes a barrier between a trusted internal network and untrusted external network

#### **Vendor Examples**:

SonicWALL / Cisco / Fortinet / Barracuda







### **DMZ-Network Demilitarized Zone**

**DMZ** - A location on a network that is open to another network (or internet) while securing a Local Area Network (LAN) behind a firewall. Exposes an organization's external-facing applications to an untrusted network while protecting LAN.

#### **Examples:**

Alarm notification software that uses email/SMS

**Remote Access** 



### SCADA Computer Recovery Plan

- If we assume that infection of malware is inevitable, then mitigating the infection becomes our highest priority.
- In all infection scenarios, restoring the SCADA computer system as fast as possible while maintaining safety/security is first step even if the infection vector has not been identified.
- Identify steps necessary to isolate network and recover SCADA computers even if infection has been on system for a long time.
- Identify the proper backups necessary for a complete backup/recovery of operating system and applications along with their restoration process.
- Do not backup up SCADA computers to online storage as the storage can be compromised. Backups should be kept in an offline media location that can not be compromised from the network.





### What is the Future of SCADA Cybersecurity?

**Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA)** – Security framework more than new technology. Organizations should not trust any entity inside or outside of their perimeter at any time. Network constantly verifying all devices, configurations, users, and network traffic.

**AI Cybersecurity** – AI Tools are being implemented in cybersecurity platforms to detect very complex intrusion attempts. This type of technology works with the ZTNA framework identified above to try and block regular and AI created hacking tools.

**Secure USB Drives** – USB drives that cannot be infected when transferring files should be used whenever possible if moving data or programs to/from SCADA computers.

**SCADA Recovery Master Plan** – Identify steps to restore systems in case of malware attack.

**Splinternet** – The internet is splintering and dividing due to various factors, such as technology, commerce, politics, nationalism, religion, and special interests. Currently, your internet router/firewall is exposed to 3.4 billion people.



# AWWA Cybersecurity Guidelines

#### **Risk and Resilience Assessment and Emergency Response Plan**

https://www.awwa.org/Portals/0/AWWA/ETS/Resources/AWWACybersecurityGuidance 2019.pdf?ver=2019-09-09-111949-960

- Governance and Risk Management
- Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery
- Server and Workstation Hardening
- Access Control Edge Protection
- Application Security
- Encryption
- Data Security

- Telecommunications/Network
   Security & Architecture
- Physical Security
- Service Level Agreements
- Operations Security (OPSEC)
- Education
- Personal Security
- Cyber-Informed Engineering



#### **Additional Resources**





#### Homeland Security - Industrial Control Systems Website

- <u>https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics</u>
- Website includes alerts, advisories and reports.
- Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET) Provides a systematic, disciplined, and repeatable approach for evaluating an organization's security posture. This is not a network scanner; this is Q&A software that grades an industrial networks security.

#### **Google 7 Hour Cyber Security Full Course for Beginners:**

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MYF6Zo6i6A





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